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SCREENING MEANING

Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan S. Masur & Mark P. McKenna
ABSTRACT
Trademark law exists to promote competition. If consumers know
which companies are responsible for which products, they can more
easily find the products they actually want to purchase, and companies
will have incentives to cultivate reputations for high quality. Trademark
law has long treated “source significance”—the fact that a particular
trademark is identified with a particular producer—as both necessary
and sufficient for establishing a valid trademark. That is, trademark
law has traditionally viewed source significance as the only necessary
precondition for a trademark being pro-competitive. In this paper, we
establish that this equation of source significance and procompetitiveness is misguided. Some marks use words and images that
are so closely connected with the product being branded that giving just
one firm a monopoly over those words and images provides that firm
with a meaningful competitive advantage—an artificial advantage
granted by the state. This problem becomes worse as the number of
firms producing (and branding) a type of product increases.
The more words cordoned off by trademark law, the more trouble
a new entrant will have in describing or attracting attention to its
product. Trademark law is thus being hijacked by strategic firms for
anti-competitive purposes. Traditional doctrinal tools are inadequate to
address this problem because the goal is to limit the number of such
trademarks rather than eliminate them completely. However, costly
screens could be used to impose a form of congestion pricing on
trademarks, eliminating them in all but the most worthwhile cases. In
this paper, we develop a theory of the anti-competitive nature of certain
trademark rules. We then propose a series of overlapping doctrinal rules
and costly screens to address the problem of rampant anticompetitive
trademarks.
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Introduction
Imagine that the electronics firm Persimmon, Inc. begins selling a new fitness
tracker that it calls ActivTrak. The firm is trying to enter a crowded market for
consumer electronics, and it has some new technology that it hopes will set its
ActivTrak device apart. Persimmon spends substantial sums of money advertising its
device on television and online, to the point that if you took a survey of consumers
and asked them about the “ActivTrak,” a large number of them would remember that
it’s the new type of fitness tracker made by Persimmon. The firm registers the name
ActivTrak as a trademark. Now, no other firm can use those words for similar
products without violating Persimmon’s trademark rights.1
It is presumably good for consumers to have another fitness tracker on the
market.2 But what about Persimmon’s branding and marketing strategy? Will it have
positive or negative (or negligible) consequences for consumers in the electronics
market? On the one hand, consumers now know that if they see a fitness tracker with
the name ActivTrak on it, that device was made by Persimmon.3 If a consumer thinks
that Persimmon generally produces products of high (or low) quality, the trademarks
can help her to purchase (or avoid) Persimmon products in the future. And because
Persimmon alone will reap the reputational benefits (or bear the reputational costs)
of its products, it has an incentive to maintain consistent product quality.
But from a competition perspective, there is a darker side to this branding.
Because “active” is an obvious word to associate with fitness trackers, giving
Persimmon the exclusive right to use “ActivTrack” could give it a significant market
advantage.4 And that advantage will likely extend beyond preventing competitors
We address some of trademark’s limiting doctrines below. See infra Part II.A.
But see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004) (discussing social
science evidence that more choices can, in some circumstances, lead to worse outcomes).
3 Or at least they should know that all devices bearing those marks come from the same source, even
if they don’t know that Persimmon is the source. This is trademark law’s anonymous source rule. See
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 844 n.70
(2004) (citing Manhattan Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933))
4 Notice, by contrast, that the brand “Persimmon” causes substantially less competitive risk. Because
persimmons have nothing to do with electronics, the exclusive use of the term to sell electronics
1
2
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from using the term “ActivTrack” as a whole; indeed, there’s a meaningful risk that
rights in that composite mark will be used to bar others from identifying their own
devices (or similar products) using the word “active” (and maybe even “track”).
Competitors unwilling to risk litigation will have to find other evocative words and
phrases to identify their own fitness trackers. But how many other signifiers have
the power of the word “active?” That term immediately summons the idea of fitness,
and Persimmon’s ActivTrak may come to the minds of consumers more quickly and
easily than the names of competing products. And the alternatives available to
competitors are not unlimited in number.5 Once firms have snapped up “active,” “fit,”
and “run,” the available store of evocative brand names will diminish relatively
rapidly. The latest firm to try and enter this crowded marketplace might find itself
climbing a steep hill, so to speak.
The types of competitive advantages associated with exclusive control of
particularly powerful words have real costs for consumers. If Persimmon can limit
the words that competitors can use, it can make it harder for those competitors to
reach consumers. This may mean that consumers are steered toward Persimmon’s
products when they would otherwise prefer another brand, or it might just mean
other brands have a harder time gaining traction in the market and therefore can’t
compete as effectively with Persimmon. As a result, Persimmon may be able to charge
higher prices. And, critically, those advantages do not accrue because Persimmon’s
product is better. They accrue because the law gives Persimmon the right to limit
others’ use of the word “active” in connection with their competing fitness trackers.6
Trademark law should be attuned to these competition concerns. Indeed, these
are the principal concerns to which trademark law should be attuned. Trademark
law exists to promote fair competition, which ultimately benefits consumers. If

imposes no real harm on competitors while generating considerable benefits for consumers and for the
firm itself. See infra Part II.A.
5 The electronic device category is one of the most cluttered fields of trademark registrations. Barton
Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running out of Trademarks: An Empirical Study of Trademark
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1017 (2018).
6 Depending on the nature of the designs of the firm’s logo or product packaging, the same concerns
might apply equally, if not more, to exclusive rights in those features.
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certain types of trademarks tend to inhibit competition, to the detriment of
consumers, those are the types of trademarks that the law should screen out.
Trademark law purports to address those concerns by distinguishing between
marks based on their meaning. The law makes it harder to acquire trademark rights
in descriptive terms, which it deems not inherently distinctive, than it does in
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful terms, which it treats as inherently distinctive. But
courts and the PTO can’t consistently identify words that have gained the kind of
source significance that purportedly justifies their protection. And even if the
doctrines worked better, they wouldn’t solve the whole problem. For one thing, they
draw the line at descriptive terms, ignoring altogether the potential costs of
suggestive terms, which are protected automatically upon use. More fundamentally,
trademark doctrine reflects its concerns about the costs of protection primarily by
demanding more evidence of source significance.7
But as the ActivTrak example makes clear, source significance is not the whole
story in terms of the competitive consequences of recognizing trademark rights.
Protection of some terms that indicate source will still have an overall
anticompetitive effect because those terms have distinct competitive advantages.
Trademark doctrine is thus ineffective at screening out harmful marks because it
focuses only on source significance and not on broader issues of competition.
This is not inevitable. Indeed, there are a variety of doctrinal changes that
could help cure trademark law’s myopia and more effectively focus its gaze on issues
of competition, rather than merely source significance. It could do that with doctrinal
screens that more categorically prohibit trademark protection of the kinds of marks
that are likely to cause competitive harm. But no doctrinal screen is perfect. Doctrinal
screens are inevitably porous; they fail to screen out some socially harmful marks.8

Trademark law also permits others to make non-trademark use of descriptive terms even if a party
is able to prove secondary meaning and therefore acquire trademark rights in those terms. We discuss
descriptive fair use in Part II.C below. It also refuses protection to functional features even if those
features indicate source. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001).
8 See Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J.
75 (2018); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687
(2010).
7
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Accordingly, we propose implementing costly screens to complement
trademark law’s existing doctrinal screens. A costly screen is a cost that a private
actor, such as a firm like Persimmon, must pay before acquiring a particular legal
right or entitlement—here, valid trademark rights. A costly screen forces private
parties to decide how much they value the particular legal right and how much they’re
willing to pay to obtain it. By increasing the price of obtaining the kinds of
trademarks that are most likely to produce anticompetitive results, costly screens can
channel firms towards selecting less harmful alternative marks.
Using costly screens is a second-best alternative in a world where doctrinal
screens are imperfect. Costly screens inevitably create wealth effects, and applying
them to highly dynamic product markets can be challenging. But a well-structured
costly screen can ultimately aid new entrants and improve competition. It can screen
out rights that would do more harm than good while still allowing private parties to
obtain rights that will do more good than harm. Here, well-structured costly screens
could eliminate many anticompetitive trademarks while preserving pro-competitive
ones. Or so we shall argue.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we describe the way trademark
law is meant to operate. In Part II, we explain and analyze the law’s shortcomings—
how its focus on source significance has obscured greater questions of anticompetitive
advantage. In Part III we limn the operation of doctrinal and costly screens. We
demonstrate that, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, trademark law
lacks a meaningful costly screen that might deter private parties from seeking
anticompetitive trademarks. Finally, in Part IV we explain how these shortcomings
of trademark law could be alleviated with more effective doctrinal and costly screens.
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I.

Trademarks and Competition

The standard account of the way that giving firms9 or other organizations
certain exclusive rights in names, symbols, or designs can improve markets and
competition is well known, and we won’t rehearse it at great length here.10 As is often
true in the law, understanding trademark law’s competition benefits is easier when
contemplating the doctrine’s nonexistence.
Imagine that a winery has adopted the name SHEEP to identify and label the
products that it makes. The winery sells a bunch of bottles so labeled, and people like
it and want to buy more SHEEP wine. But when they return to the market, shoppers
see four different bottles of wine all labeled SHEEP.11 The different bottles all look
basically the same, and there is no way, short of opening each one, for consumers to
determine which one or any may be made by the winery that made the first bottle
they tried. Goods like wine are valued primarily for their “experience” qualities—
aspects of the goods that consumers can’t discover merely by looking at them but have
to actually experience.12 But when several bottles all have the SHEEP mark, the
consumers can’t figure out which of the bottles might offer the same pleasures as the
first SHEEP wine, so they choose randomly. Unhappily, three of four consumers won’t
get the wine that they want and instead will purchase a wine made by a different
winery.
This is unfair competition. When we say that the wineries that bottled the
other SHEEP wines did so “unfairly,” what we mean is that they have created a
meaningful risk of consumer harm and prevented the first winery from making sales

Throughout this Article we refer to “firms” and their behaviors, because firms or other corporate
entities are the most important actors in trademark regulation. We recognize, though, that individuals
and other entities also use trademarks.
10 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010), William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1987).
11 This is a serious risk in some wine regions. See Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan S. Masur & Ryan
Whalen, Measuring Brand Congestion in Bordeaux Wines: Too Many Towers, Hills, and Crosses?,. J.
WINE ECON. (forthcoming 2022) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3903323.
12 On the distinction between search goods and experience goods, see Phillip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
9
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that it had earned. Some of the people who wanted to buy wines with the qualities
that they associated with the producer initially using the SHEEP name on its wines
didn’t get the wines that they wanted. They didn’t necessarily get worse wine; they
just didn’t get the wine they were hoping for. They were deceived into purchasing
wine from other producers rather than the one with whom they had positive
associations.
Trademark law exists to prevent this risk of consumer deception. The law gives
the first winery to use the word SHEEP on its products the exclusive right to do so,
at least within that category of goods.13 Now, having formed a positive association
with wines labeled SHEEP or having been told to seek out wines so labeled,
consumers can reliably obtain the products that they desire. Having identified a
particular product with a particular source, consumers can feel confident, in a world
with trademark law, that they will be able to use particular symbols as indicators
and guarantors of source.14
Understood this way, trademark law has significant benefits for consumers.15
It enables people to buy the products they think they’re buying with less risk of being
deceived. But trademark law has benefits for producers too, and courts and
commentators frequently describe trademark law in dual-benefit terms.16 Most
directly, giving firms exclusive rights ensures that the consumer confidence we
described translates into sales for the first user and that those sales aren’t diverted
to others who act deceptively. Less directly, trademark rights can allow producers to
capture the value of investments in product quality.
Thus, for example, a producer of women’s clothing might also adopt the mark SHEEP for its goods.
See www.sheepofficial.com.
14 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 275.
15 Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the
Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 9 (2009).
16 United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com BV, 140 S.Ct. 2298, 2302 (2020)
(“Guarding a trademark against use by others, this Court has explained, “secure[s] to the owner of the
mark the goodwill” of her business and “protect[s] the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers.”) quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
Commentators have long debated which interests trademark law primarily serves. Compare Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2013) with
Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of The Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 547 (2006). At its core, however, consumer and competitor interests will tend to converge.
13
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Consider the winery example again. Imagine that a winery believes that if it
ages its wines in new oak barrels, the resulting product will be superior to those of
its competitors. The barrels and aging cost money, though, and the winery will have
to charge more for the wine in order to offset the expense of these improvements.
Now, again, the winery sells its wine using the name SHEEP on its labels, and some
consumers taste the wine and appreciate the added flavor and richness that the oak
barrels contribute. In a market without trademark law, though, other producers could
use the same SHEEP mark on their bottles and price them more cheaply, because
they did not invest in expensive aging.17 The same problem reemerges. Consumers
who are willing to pay more for oak aging cannot use brand names to reliably
determine which products are so treated, and knowing this, the wineries are
discouraged from making improvements in product quality, because they will not
recoup their investments.18 So trademark law, by helping consumers find the
products that they want, can enable socially valuable competition.19
But consider a different situation. Because of an error at the winery, after a
batch of white grapes is pressed, the juice is left to linger on the grape skins for
several weeks. The resulting wine has a much darker amber color than a standard
white wine along with a richer, fuller flavor. It turns out that people like the wine,
and the winery bottles it, calling it “orange” wine.20 Because of its popularity, other
wineries also want to make this style of wine, and the initial winery doesn’t have a

McKenna, supra note 16, at 1865.
Sellers that age their wine could, of course, say so on their labels (describing their wine as “oak
aged”), but consumers wouldn’t be able to use the trademark as a shortcut for those characteristics
and couldn’t know exactly what characteristics “oak aged” referred to without tasting the wine. And
they may not even know that the characteristics they liked were due to the oak aging; they just liked
the SHEEP wine.
19 See also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946) (trademark statutes aim to “protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get”). Booking.com, 140 S.Ct. at
2302 (“We have recognized that federal trademark protection, supplementing state law, “supports the
free flow of commerce” and “foster[s] competition.”).
20 See Orange Wine, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_wine.
17
18
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patent that prevents them from doing so.21 The other wineries also want consumers
to be able to find their wines and understand what they are buying, so they too use
the term “orange” to describe their wines. From the perspective of the initial winery,
allowing others to use the term “orange” feels like unfair competition, because it’s
going to lose sales to its rivals or be forced to reduce its prices. But from consumers’
and rivals’ perspectives, this is the essence of fair competition.22 Consumers get a
range of options in a particular category, and they can choose the one that best aligns
with their preferences for quality and price. And competitors are able to accurately
describe competing products without having to resort to alternative terms.23 If
competitors were barred from using the word “orange” to describe their orange-tinged
wine, they would not be able to accurately convey to consumers that they are making
a similar product in a similar way.24
Thus, although trademark law can have important pro-competitive benefits,
the recognition of exclusive rights to words, symbols, or designs can also have harmful
effects on competition and, thus, on consumers, if those rights aren’t appropriately
tailored. For instance, if a winery were allowed to choose as its mark terms like
WINE, RED WINE, or OAK AGED, other wineries would face enormous hurdles
trying to describe their products without infringing the initial firm’s rights. These
words are so closely tied to the product at issue—red wine—that giving a single firm
an intellectual property right over one or more of the words would bestow upon that
firm a substantial competitive advantage.
These are the types of harms that trademark law should be trying to avoid. As
we detail below, existing doctrine is not ignorant of these concerns. Indeed,

In this case, it couldn’t obtain a patent since the methods for making orange wine have been known
for centuries. Id.
22 Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661 (1999).
23 Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 290.
24 This is one of the challenges posed by geographic indication laws that prohibit use of certain
geographic terms even when those terms are treated as generic for certain categories of goods. See Kal
Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle Over Geographic Indications, 18 EUR. J. INT. L.
337 (2007).
21
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trademark doctrine purports to avoid them. But as we will explain, it has fallen
notably short.

II.

The Shortcomings of Trademark Doctrine

In the prior Part, we briefly explained both the necessity of trademark rules
and the possible pitfalls of granting trademark rights. In theory, well-crafted
trademark law doctrine would permit trademarks that inform consumers and
promote competition while screening out trademarks that award anticompetitive
advantages and diminish consumer choice. But that is not how the law has developed,
as the following Part explains. Here, we describe how flaws in trademark law’s
fundamental assumptions have allowed anticompetitive marks to proliferate.

A.

The Advantages of Certain Words
Word marks are the paradigmatic example of how firms and consumers

communicate about product source and the paradigmatic form of trademark around
which the eligibility rules were developed. But not all word marks are equivalent
from a competition perspective. In some cases, a firm’s choice of a particular word
mark may give it undue competitive advantages over its rivals, enabling it to engage
in rent seeking behavior that lowers consumer welfare.25 In other circumstances, the
sheer volume of claimed word marks may be substantially increasing the costs of
entry for new firms, because too many of the “good” word marks are already claimed
in a given field.26
It is an axiomatic principle of trademark law that different kinds of word
marks have different impacts on competition.27 Trademark law understands these
differential effects primarily through the lens of “distinctiveness.” As a matter of
See infra notes 61-73.
See infra notes 99-106.
27 Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law Protect the
Strong More than the Weak, 92 NYU L REV. 1339, 1341 (2017).
25
26
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current doctrine, signs that indicate source—that is, signs that indicate to consumers
which producer is responsible for the goods—are called “distinctive,” and distinctive
signs are, by definition, trademarks.28 That is, distinctiveness is treated as both
necessary and sufficient for trademark validity.29 But not all words or phrases are
treated the same in terms of how the law assess their potential distinctiveness.
Trademark law has long evaluated words’ distinctiveness by categorizing them
along the famous Abercrombie spectrum.30 That approach treats terms differently
depending upon the amount of information the terms provide about the products or
services with which they’re used.31 Arbitrary terms (terms that have existing
meanings that are unrelated to the goods, like Apple for computers of Sheep for wine)
and fanciful terms (coined terms, like Exxon) are considered inherently distinctive,
which means they are protected as trademarks immediately upon use, without need
for evidence that consumers actually associate the terms with particular producers.32
That legal treatment is based in part on an empirical assumption that consumers will

Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2003). That
distinctive terms qualify as trademarks doesn’t necessarily mean they are protected irrespective of
their use. Courts and especially the Trademark Office also insist that the mark be used in a way that
it functions as a mark, though as Alex Roberts has detailed at length, the relationship between failure
to function and distinctiveness is underdeveloped and the doctrine is often ad hoc. Alexandra J.
Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977 (2018).
29 Saying that distinctiveness is both necessary and sufficient for trademark status is not to say that
distinctiveness is sufficient for registration. Section 2 of the Lanham Act details the bases on which
marks can be denied registration, and those bases include but are not limited to distinctiveness. See
15 USC § 1052. The fact that registration can be refused on other grounds does not undermine our
point, because registration is not necessary for trademark protection. There are benefits to
registration, but unregistered marks are enforceable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act on largely
the same terms. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“it is common
ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles
qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in
determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)”).
30 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Arrayed in an
ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of
protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or
fanciful.”); Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (approving of the Abercrombie spectrum as the “classic
formulation” of distinctiveness).
31 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
32 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11
(2000) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
28
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automatically treat arbitrary and fanciful terms as trademarks.33 Because those
terms provide no information about the nature or characteristics of the goods or
services with which they’re used, consumers are presumed to have no way to
understand their use except as trademarks. Why else would someone put the word
“Apple” on a computer?34
Trademark law also treats so-called “suggestive” terms, like “Igloo” for coolers,
as inherently distinctive and protected as marks immediately upon use.35 Unlike
arbitrary and fanciful terms, suggestive terms relate to the goods they’re used with.
Igloo doesn’t describe coolers, but it evokes something cold, so the connection is
obvious once the goods are known. Suggestive terms provide indirect information
about the goods, which distinguishes them from arbitrary terms. But precisely
because the information that suggestive terms provide is indirect, trademark law
treats them more like arbitrary terms than descriptive ones.36 Just as with other
inherently distinctive terms, the assumption is that consumers will be predisposed to
understand suggestive terms as brand names rather than descriptions of the
product.37
In addition to the assumptions about consumer understanding that underlie
the treatment of arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive terms as inherently distinctive,
courts have long assumed that other parties have no real need to use those terms for
their own goods because those terms provide no information about the goods or

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) (contrasting color with “fanciful,”
“arbitrary,” or “suggestive” words or designs, which “almost automatically tell a customer that they
refer to a brand”); id. at 163 (“The imaginary word “Suntost,” or the words “Suntost Marmalade,” on a
jar of orange jam immediately would signal a brand or a product “source”; the jam's orange color does
not do so.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (Suggestive, arbitrary, and
fanciful marks “because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are
deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection”).
34 It does not matter whether consumers know that an APPLE computer is manufactured by the Apple
Computer Company, only that they believe all computers that bear the word APPLE come from the
same source. See Austin, supra note 3.
35 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 210-11.
36 Id.
37 2 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11:4
33
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services they’re associated with.38 Indeed, the belief that there was no legitimate
explanation for using an arbitrary or fanciful term previously adopted by a competitor
was the justification for treating those terms as trademarks and enforcing them as
intellectual property rights.39

Because competitors could choose from an nearly

infinite variety of other terms, the law has assumed that automatically treating
suggestive terms as trademarks imposes little to no competitive harm.40
Other kinds of words convey more information about the goods or services with
which they’re used. Descriptive terms convey direct information about the qualities
or characteristics of goods.41 When consumers see the word “tasty” on a food product
they might think that word is a trademark, but they might just as easily (and even
more plausibly) think that term simply describes the food product as “tasty.”42 The
same can be said of geographic terms, which are treated like descriptive terms.43
“Milwaukee’s Best” might be a brand of beer; but, depending on how it’s used, it might
also just be a laudatory description of beer from Milwaukee.

Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 11:68.
39 Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 F. 623, 627 (1st Cir. 1915) (“In the case of infringement of a
technical trade-mark the intention of the infringer is immaterial, as the essence of the wrong lies in
the injury to a property right; while in the case of unfair competition the intention is material, to
establish fraud on the part of the defendant in the use of the imitative device to beguile the public into
buying his goods as those of his rival.”); Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366, 375 (4th Cir. 1904); (“There are
certain elements of property right in a technical trade-mark . . . .”); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99
F. 276, 279 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900) (“It is commonly said that there is a right of property in a technical
trade-mark, and an infringement of it is spoken of as a violation of a property right.”). For a more
thorough description of the traditional relationship between trademark and unfair competition and its
evolution over time, see Mark P. McKenna, Property and Equity in Trademark Law, 23 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 117 (2019).
40 Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 289 (“There are 450,000 words in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, and although they are not freely substitutable if one is trying to say
something that will be understood, they are freely substitutable if one is uninterested in meaning.”).
41 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 11:16
42 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213 (“And where it is not reasonable to assume consumer
predisposition to take an affixed word or packaging as indication of source—where, for example, the
affixed word is descriptive of the product (“Tasty” bread) or of a geographic origin (“Georgia” peaches)—
inherent distinctiveness will not be found.”). In reality, consumer understanding of that term probably
depends significantly on how and where the term appears on a package. See Tom Lee et al. But
distinctiveness, as opposed to failure to function, considers the meaning of terms in relation to goods
and (usually) not based on particular use context.
43 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 14:1
38
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Precisely because descriptive terms convey information about the goods or
services, protecting them as trademarks also comes at greater cost to competitors who
also need to convey information to consumers.44 Giving one party exclusive rights to
use the term “tasty” for food products limits competitors’ ability to communicate that
their products are also tasty.45 Likewise, giving one party exclusive rights to
“Milwaukee’s Best” limits other Milwaukee-based beer producers’ ability to inform
consumers where their beer is made.
Because consumer understanding is not a given, and because of the potential
competitive costs of exclusive rights, descriptive terms (and geographic terms) have
to earn their way into trademark status by acquiring distinctiveness. 46 Specifically,
those terms are protected as trademarks only when consumers have come to
understand that, in addition to conveying information about the goods, the terms
identify source.47 Trademark law calls this “secondary meaning”—secondary not in
the sense of being of secondary importance, but in the sense of being second in time
to the primary, descriptive meaning.48 “Best Buy” might once simply have described
a store with good deals, but over time consumers have come to associate that phrase
with a particular company, at least in the context of retail stores selling electronics.

It turns out arbitrary marks may also be in short supply, as Barton Beebe and Jeanne Fromer have
shown. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5. And even fanciful marks may be more constrained than we
assume. See infra notes 99-105
45 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 11:18. See also Educational Development Corp. v. Economy Co., 562
F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1952); W. E.
Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 354 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1966); Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699
F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1983).
46 Those terms used to be excluded from trademark subject matter. Parties claiming that their
competitors were misusing descriptive or geographic terms (or surnames) in order to pass off their
goods as those of the claimant could seek relief under the common law of unfair competition. See
McKenna, supra note 39. Unfair competition remedies were more limited—the claimant typically could
not get an injunction against use of the descriptive or geographic term altogether, but only limitations
on the manner of the defendant’s use.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (f); Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769; see also Park ‘N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194.
The owners of registered marks that are not yet incontestable can also face descriptiveness challenges,
though the registration affords the registrant a presumption of validity, putting the burden on the
defendant to show descriptiveness. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Park ‘N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 196.
48 For that reason, “acquired distinctiveness” might be a better term.
44
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Courts commonly say that secondary meaning may be proven by both direct
and circumstantial evidence.49 But while “the authorities” [may be] “in agreement
that survey evidence is the most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary
meaning,”50 in fact courts most often focus on circumstantial evidence such as the
“amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, and length and manner of use.”51
The idea is that consumers’ exposure over time trains them to regard an otherwise
descriptive term as having an additional, source-related meaning.52 Having acquired
distinctiveness, descriptive terms become trademarks, and competitors are
substantially limited in the ways they can use those terms to describe their own
goods.
Finally, terms that simply name a relevant category of product or service are
deemed “generic” and can never be trademarks.53 The primary significance of the
term to the relevant consuming public controls,54 but courts have articulated the test
of genericness in several similar ways. In the recent Booking.com case, the Supreme
Court defined a generic term as one that “names a ‘class’ of goods or services, rather
than any particular feature or exemplification of the class,”55 and it emphasized that
the only relevant meaning was the meaning to consumers. Hence, “whether

MCCARTHy, supra note 37, at §15:30; see also Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co.,
LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2001); Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.3d
527, 546 (5th Cir. 2015); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298,
315 (6th Cir. 2001).
50 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983).
51 Id. See MCCARTHY supra note 37, at § 15:48 (“The easiest and least expensive manner of proving
secondary meaning is to introduce evidence of the amount and nature of advertising of the mark; the
length of time the mark has been in use; and the amount of goods or services sold under the mark.”).
52 MCCARTHY supra note 37, at § 15:48.
53 Booking.com, 591 U.S. at 2303 (“The name of the good itself (e.g., “wine”) is incapable of
“distinguish[ing] [one producer's goods] from the goods of others” and is therefore ineligible for
registration. Indeed, generic terms are ordinarily ineligible for protection as trademarks at all.”)
(internal citations omitted). 2 MCCARTHY supra note 37, at§ 12:1, at 12–5 (“Of course, to properly be
called an unprotectable ‘generic name’ in trademark law, the designation must be the name of the
same product or service which it is alleged to identify the source of.”).
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 par. 3 (2006) (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant
public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark
has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”).
55 Booking.com, 591 U.S. at 2303 citing Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (“A generic term is one that refers
to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”).
49
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‘Booking.com’ is generic turn[ed] on whether that term, taken as a whole, signifie[d]
to consumers the class of online hotel-reservation services.”56
The exclusion of generic terms from protection can be explained in two
different ways, and both policy justifications are frequently noted by courts. One
explanation focuses on consumer understanding: generic terms do not do the job of a
trademark because they do not indicate source.57 But another explanation offered
with similar frequency focuses on the costs of protecting a generic term. Here courts
often characterize protection of a generic term as conferring a sort of monopoly on the
claimant.58 Because a generic term names a relevant product category, giving a
particular producer exclusive rights to that term would give that producer a
significant advantage over competitors who would be unable to signal to consumers
that their products competed in that same market. That helps explain the concept of
“genericide,” in which once-valuable trademarks that clearly did (and likely still do)
indicate source to some consumers are nonetheless denied future protection because
a majority of the consuming public has come to associate the term with the entire
class of goods.59
In sum, the process of determining the distinctiveness of purported word
marks is a categorization exercise, where the categories reflect the extent to which
Booking.com, 591 U.S. at 2303.
See id. (protection depends on capacity to indicate source); Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaght Labs.,
Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Trademark protection benefits consumers by enabling them to
select products on the basis of their origin. This encourages sellers to create and maintain good will by
marketing products of reliable quality that consumers associate with their mark. Consumers will not
benefit, however, if trademark law prevents competitors from using generic or descriptive terms to
inform the public of the nature of their product.”).
58 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The genericness doctrine
prevents trademarks from serving as the substitutes for patents, and protects the public right to copy
any non-patented, functional characteristic of a competitor’s product.”); Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d
at 10 (to protect a generic name would be to “confer a monopoly” on one seller in the sale of the named
product); see also Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1819 (2007) (“Modern courts refuse to extend trademark protection to generic
words or terms because they are concerned that doing so would negatively impact competition.”).
59 See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding
“thermos” to be a generic term for vacuum-insulated containers); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed
Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding “cellophane” to be a generic term for transparent
cellulose film); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding “aspirin” to be a
generic term for acetyl salicylic acid).
56
57
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the claimed term gives information about the goods. The primary legal distinction is
between terms that are inherently distinctive (fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive
terms) and those that are not. Inherently distinctive terms are automatically treated
as trademarks; some non-inherently distinctive terms (descriptive terms, geographic
terms, surnames) can earn their way into trademark status by developing secondary
meaning. Terms that name a relevant category of products or services are deemed
generic and can never serve as trademarks.60

B.

Word Marks and Communicative Competition
While it certainly makes sense for trademark law to approach validity

taxonomically rather than trying to adjudicate the competitive effects of each claimed
mark, its taxonomy must reflect the realities of language usage and market
competition. Yet there are good reasons to believe that the law systematically
underestimates the challenges that trademark creates for new market entrants.
Begin with suggestive terms. The law treats suggestive terms as inherently
distinctive on the twin assumptions that (a) those terms don’t provide direct
information about the goods, and (b) that their exclusive control doesn’t produce
significant competitive harms. Both of those assumptions are at least overstated if
not flatly wrong in many cases.
First, it’s simply not true that exclusive use of suggestive terms imposes de
minimis competitive harm. Rather, those terms often offer real advantages to mark
owners. For example, people might pay more for a white wine that is branded as
BUTTER61 than they would an otherwise identical product, simply because the name
has positive connotations for them.62 But the wine is not made of butter, so even

Almost never. There are small number of cases in which formerly generic terms have been reclaimed
as trademarks, but those are decidedly the exception to the rule.
61 Maria Dinzeo, Jury Will Decide Winemaker Clash Over ‘Buttery’ Chardonnay, COURTHOUSE NEWS,
Apr. 20, 2020, https://www.courthousenews.com/jury-will-decide-winemaker-clash-over-butterychardonnay/.
62 Although not necessarily for the authors of this Article.
60
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though white wines are often described as “buttery,”63 the Trademark Office treated
BUTTER as inherently distinctive and registered it without requiring evidence of
secondary meaning.64 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that the mark 5-HOUR
ENERGY was suggestive rather than descriptive, because the kind of energy and the
method of its transference were ambiguous.65 But granting the claimant an
immediately valid trademark in such a term gives it a substantial competitive
advantage.66 Even if that term doesn’t describe everything about the relevant
product, it clearly identifies some of the product’s most important qualities.
Consumers may wonder if competitors’ products will provide an equivalent period of
energy.67
Again, there is nothing wrong with one party obtaining a competitive
advantage by virtue of having created a better product. That is in the nature of
competition. The problem arises because firms are using government-sanctioned
monopolies on language to gain competitive advantages that have nothing to do with
the quality of their products or identification of their source. This is a strategic
distortion of market competition.
One likely cause of the law’s insensitivity to these issues is its focus on the
needs of competitors rather than on competitive benefits trademarks are conveying
to claimants. Courts assume that granting rights in inherently distinctive marks
imposes little or no cost on competitors who are free to choose from a nearly infinite
dictionary of alternative options to brand their goods. According to Landes and
Posner: “There are 450,000 words in Webster's Third New International Dictionary,

White wines that undergo malolactic fermentation, which converts malic acid into lactic acid, may
have flavors that people describe as “buttery.” F. Sauvageot & P. Vivier, Effects of Malolactic
Fermentation on Sensory Properties of Four Burgundy Wines, 48 AM. J. ENOLOGY & VITICULTURE 187
(1997).
64 U.S. Reg. No. 3,999,253
65 Innovation Ventures, LLC 6 v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2012). Jake Linford, The
False Dichotomy between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1380-81
(2015).
66 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 434 (1999).
67 Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO St.
L.J. 1367, 1415 (2015).
63
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and although they are not freely substitutable if one is trying to say something that
will be understood, they are freely substitutable if one is uninterested in meaning.”68
They assume, as do most courts, that word marks at the top of the Abercrombie
distinctiveness spectrum are basically fungible and unlimited.
The trouble is, almost no one else thinks so, including the professionals hired
to help firms choose brand names.69 As Jake Linford has recently argued, certain
sounds seem to attach more naturally to some goods than to others.70 Marks like
SWIFFER for a sweeping device or VIAGRA for an erectile disfunction medication
rely on sound symbolism to create, perhaps unconsciously, associations between a
product and its desirable attributes.71 Because trademark law’s evaluation of those
terms focuses exclusively on semantic meaning, it pays no attention to sound
symbolism or other ways marks convey information. It therefore underestimates the
true competitive effects of exclusive rights in suggestive terms.72 Although a winery
may not need to describe its Chardonnay using the term “butter” or a caffeine shot
may not have to refer to the precise period of energy it provides, being able to use
those terms is enormously beneficial.73
Consider a mark like “Igloo” for coolers. If we focus on the needs of competitors,
we might think that exclusive rights in the term do little to harm them, because they
are free to adopt any number of alternative terms that might be available. But if we
instead think about the competitive benefits that trademark rights provide, we
“Igloo” may prove enormously beneficial. Consumers might think that Igloo-branded
coolers keep their drinks colder than ones without the brand.74 The name might be

Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 289.
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 770 (1990) (“The immediate
difficulty with any theory premised on the IM assumption, however, is that virtually no one involved
in the selection and testing of marks seems to think that IM presents a useful picture of the world.”).
70 Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful, 105 GEO. L.J. 731, 756 (2017) (“But creating a new
word to serve as a trademark is presumed to have almost entirely salutary effects.”).
71 Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 966 (“VIAGRA calls to mind, all at once, ‘vigor,’ ‘vitality,’
‘aggression,’ and ‘Niagara’ (suggesting both water and honeymoons).”).
72 Linford, supra note 70, at 758.
73 Linford, supra note 67, at 1385.
74 Of course the term “igloo” as a symbol for products that keep things cold is odd, given that igloos are
supposed to keep their occupants warm.
68
69
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more memorable and therefore might be front of mind for consumers looking for a
cooler, even compared to functionally superior coolers. Thus, competitors will have to
work harder and spend more on advertising to offset the advantage of a memorable
name. Or they might have to lower their prices to compete on another dimension. If
any of those things are true, competitors are at a disadvantage because of the
exclusive rights that trademark law bestows cheaply and easily. Courts have been
quick to make the illogical leap from the fact that competitors don’t need to use the
mark (which might be true) to the conclusion that allowing one firm to control the
mark imposes no competitive harm. That simply does not follow.75
The situation with descriptive marks is yet worse, because trademark law
treats secondary meaning as both a necessary and sufficient condition for a
descriptive term having net pro-competitive effects.76 Yet even when a descriptive
term has acquired secondary meaning and now signifies source, exclusive rights to
that term may still confer substantial competitive benefits on the firm that owns the
mark. Take, for example, Milwaukee’s Best. Even though that brand name has
become associated with a particular producer and acquired secondary meaning, that
does not mean that it has lost its descriptive value. The existence of the trademark
still prevents competitors from identifying their own beer as the best that is brewed
in Milwaukee. Only one company can call its beer Milwaukee’s Best, and that has
ramifications for the beer market to the extent that at least some consumers identify
Milwaukee with high-quality brewing.

C.

The Excessive Scope of Descriptive Trademarks
These competitive effects are exacerbated by the difficulty of drawing lines

between categories of marks and even between marks themselves. As the examples

To be more precise, when courts focus on competitive need, they tend to set a high threshold and do
not recognize need unless there are very few alternatives available to competitors. Because they ignore
important benefits, they misjudge the number of real alternatives and too readily conclude that the
benefits to the mark claimant don’t come at the expense of others.
76 See supra notes 46-52.
75
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above reflect, the line between descriptive and suggestive terms is notoriously
unclear.77 All categorization schemes have boundary problems, of course, but
trademark law draws a fundamental legal distinction on the basis of a factual
distinction that approaches arbitrariness.78 Take, for example, the recent lawsuit
filed against Ford by Cruise LLC and General Motors. Cruise and GM claim that
Ford’s use of BlueCruise for an automated driving system infringes their rights in
the marks CRUISE and SUPER CRUISE and several CRUISE-related marks for
automated driving technology.79 It's hardly a stretch to connect the term Cruise to
automatic driving technology—“cruise control” has long been the generic term for the
feature that maintains a car’s speed without need for manual operation, and
automated driving is simply a technological extension of that feature. Nevertheless,
both Cruise and GM have successfully registered several Cruise-formative marks.80
Indeed, Cruise overcame an initial descriptiveness refusal for the original CRUISE
application simply by highlighting that its software for automated driving was not a
“device[] used to operate at a predetermined speed by use of a regulating mechanism,”
but instead “covered far more aspects or driving than speed and the speed of the
vehicle is not necessarily constant.”81 On that basis, it was able to register the mark
without evidence of secondary meaning.
One of the things the Cruise case highlights is that descriptive marks are often
asserted against non-identical marks that have only the descriptive component in
common. Cruise and GM asserted their Cruise marks against Ford’s BlueCruise. So
it’s often more than just control over the descriptive term that is at stake—protection

MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 11:71 (“One important point is that lawyers and judges should not
deceive themselves into conceiving the descriptive-suggestive dichotomy as some kind of concrete and
objective classification system. It is no more objective and free of personal predilections than a test
which asks persons to divide all color shades into “light” and “dark.” The psychological bent of the
observer obviously plays a role in both cases.”).
78 See id. (listing marks held descriptive vs. suggestive).
79 Cruise LLC and General Motors v. Ford Motor Company, Case 3:21-cv-05685 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2021). According to the complaint, a subsidiary of GM acquired Cruise LLC in 2016, and in 2018 it
transitioned to a majority-owned subsidiary of GM. Complaint para 21.
80 Id.
81 Response to Office Action, App. Ser. No. 87010961 (January 23, 2017).
77
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of those terms often translates into control over adjacent terms with a descriptive
component.82
Enforcement of the other Cruise-related marks reflect the similar problem of
granting protection to compound marks. Those marks often contain words that, on
their own, would be highly descriptive of the goods with which they’re used. But under
existing doctrine, marks must be evaluated as a whole rather than broken into their
individual parts.83 As a result, many longer phrases wind up qualifying for trademark
protection despite the risks associated with the descriptive parts. That might be fine
if the rights granted those mark owners were limited in scope, such that infringement
were only found when the defendant used the entire phrase. But that often does not
happen, which means that parties are able to use trademark law to control the
descriptive terms within longer phrases.84
The rules regarding secondary meaning are perhaps even worse, in large part
because it’s not actually even clear that anyone knows what secondary meaning is.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]o establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer
must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product
feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product

The other Cruise-formative marks reflect the similar problem of granting protection to compound
marks. Those marks often contain words that, standing on their own, would be highly descriptive of
the goods they’re used with. But under existing doctrine, marks must be evaluated as a whole rather
than broken into their individual parts. That means that many longer phrases wind up qualifying for
trademark protection despite the risks associated with the descriptive parts.
83 This is often called the “anti-dissection” rule. McCarthy § 11:27 (“Under the anti-dissection rule, a
composite mark is tested for its validity and distinctiveness by looking at it as a whole, rather than
dissecting it into its component parts.”).
84 Indeed, they sometimes struggle even with short terms. In a recent case, the owner of the VAGISIL
mark, which it registered for various vaginal-health products, was able to prevent registration of
VAGISAN for various similar pharmaceutical preparations. Combe Inc. v. Dr. August Wolff GMBH &
Co Arzneimittel (4th Cir., April 13, 2021). It did so despite the obvious genericness of the “vagi”
component of the marks. Indeed, the court specifically rejected the idea that greater emphasis should
be placed on the other parts of the respective marks (“SIL” and “SAN”). According to the Fourth
Circuit, courts should not focus on dominant portions of single word marks; for those marks, “the
proper analysis compares whole words, not parts.” Comparing the whole words at issue, the court
believed the district court correctly concluded that the marks were closely similar—emphasizing the
similar, generic components.
82
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itself.”85 But it’s unclear whether that means that the majority of consumers must
recognize the source significance (so that “primary” is a measure of quantity), or that
the source meaning must have eclipsed the original meaning in the minds of
consumers (so that primary means dominant meaning), or some combination of both
or those things.
Professor McCarthy says that "the terms have only a temporal significance.”86
In his view, “‘[s]econdary’ meaning is so-called only because it is created second in
time, not because it is necessarily secondary in importance or significance in
customers' minds.”87 He specifically rejects the idea that the claimant must prove
that the “most important meaning of the designation is as a source identifier—a
trademark or service mark.” McCarthy continues, “[T]he legal terms of art “primary”
and “secondary” meaning do not refer to relative magnitude or prominence, but only
to meanings that were created first and second in time.”88 But it can’t be that there
is no threshold for this “second in time” meaning, in either the quantitative or
qualitative sense.89 If the three of us, but no one else, came to associate a term with
a particular producer, that couldn’t possibly be enough for secondary meaning, no
matter how clearly that meaning was second in time for us.90 Nor could it be enough
that some people think products bearing the word “tasty” usually come from FritoLay if those people recognize that Frito Lay is just describing its chips.

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163, quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
851 n.14, (1982) (“To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of
the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself.”).
86 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at §15:6.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 In another part of his treatise focused on surveys, McCarthy says that “[t]here would seem to be no
logical reason to require any higher percentage to prove secondary meaning than to prove a likelihood
of confusion.” Id. at § 32:190. In that view, there are no reasons to refuse to recognize trademark rights
if 15% of people might be confused.
90 McCarthy says “[it is not necessary that each and every member of the buyer class associate the
mark with a single source. Nor is it necessary that a majority of that group do so. It is only necessary
that a “substantial part” of the buying class make such an association.” Id. at § 15:45.
85
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The complete lack of clarity about the relevant thresholds makes secondary
meaning a matter of intuition more than evidence. Maybe because courts so often
infer secondary meaning from circumstantial evidence, they don’t even consider the
threshold question (or maybe they rely on circumstantial evidence in order to avoid
hard threshold questions). But without any identifiable goalposts, even surveys—
which would otherwise seem like the best form of secondary meaning evidence, if
there were a reliable methodology available91—can’t really give clear answers.92
That’s a serious problem for the doctrine that is supposed to be the means of balancing
competitive concerns by making it harder for parties to claim descriptive terms.
Trademark law accounts for the competitive importance of descriptive terms
in one other way. Under the doctrine of descriptive fair use, it is a defense that use of
the term “otherwise than as a mark” is “of a term or device which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party,
or their geographic origin.”93 So, for example, even if one party is able to establish
trademark rights in “Fish-Fri” for batter for frying fish, other companies are still
allowed to use “fish fry”, not as their own trademark, but for the purpose of describing
their own batter for frying fish.94
But descriptive fair use is notoriously fact intensive and difficult to apply,95 not
least because of the difficulty of determining when a use is “otherwise than as a mark”
and how that inquiry differs from the likelihood of confusion test.96 Firms that should
qualify for descriptive fair use are frequently denied the defense—or at least face
expensive litigation to establish their right to use the term—due to the confusion and
shortcomings of the doctrine.97 So there are competitive consequences to awarding

There probably isn’t. All of the available options have serious flaws.
Id. at 15:45 (“Courts have been vague and uncertain in defining what is the minimum acceptable
percentage of persons who have a secondary meaning in their minds.”).
93 15 USC 1115(b)(4).
94 See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (1983).
95 William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008).
96 See William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion isn't Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
253 (2013).
97 Id.
91
92
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trademark rights in descriptive terms that aren’t fully resolved by making room for
descriptive fair use.98 And, of course, that doctrine only makes room for other parties
to make non-trademark use of the descriptive terms. It still allows one party to get
the benefits of using the descriptive term as a brand.

D.

Markets, Entrants, and Competitive Costs
Precisely because not all marks are equally good, recent evidence that new

entrants, across a number of industries, face increasing difficulties finding high
quality trademarks is deeply concerning. A massive study from Barton Beebe and
Jeanne Fromer finds evidence of both trademark “depletion”—a decreasing number
of unclaimed useful trademarks, both in general and even within product categories—
and trademark “congestion”—an increasing number of marks claimed by more than
one owner in different product categories.99 According to the authors’ analysis of PTO
registration data, many of the “best” trademarks are already claimed in many
industries, including standard English words, short pronounceable neologisms, and
popular American surnames.100 It’s not just that the “best” marks are claimed by
someone in some industry.101 Rather, Beebe and Fromer demonstrate depletion
within product categories, where the competitive consequences of having to choose a
“worse” trademark are sharpest.102 Given the ease with which initial entrants in a
market can claim the most valuable suggestive and descriptive terms, later entrants
will be shunted off to marks that are less advantageous.

Deborah R. Gerhardt, A Masterclass in Trademark's Descriptive Fair Use Defense, 52 AKRON L. REV.
4 (2019).
99 Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 951.
100 Id.
101 Co-existence by users in different markets is a celebrated reflection of the limitations of trademark
rights, and there are many well-known examples of the same mark being used by multiple parties for
different goods or services (Delta Airlines and Delta Faucets, Apple Computers and Apple Vacations,
etc.).
102 Id. See also Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and the Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of Sharing and
Collaboration among Seattle's Craft Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355 (2019).
98
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The consequences of increasing “congestion”—firms increasingly having to
accept sharing the same word mark in different markets—are less straightforward.103
Sharing is simply a result of the limited nature of trademark rights, so congestion
may not initially seem like a competition problem.104 But in a world of ever-expanding
trademark rights, where mark owners assert claims against a wider range of uses
and where market organization and promotional activity make the boundaries
between markets less clear, congestion means conflict. To take one recent example,
when the team formerly known as the Cleveland Indians announced that they would
become the Cleveland Guardians, people were quick to criticize them for failing to do
their due diligence: it turns out there’s already a professional roller derby team called
the Cleveland Guardians.105 But as the team made clear, there were legal landmines
everywhere: “You’re not going to find a name that someone’s not using today,” said
the team president. “You’ve got to work through agreements with others.” 106
Word mark depletion and congestion across the Abercrombie spectrum impose
substantial costs on new entrants to crowded fields. New firms have to select from a
competitively weaker range of options—longer or harder to pronounce words, words
that are farther from the semantic core of the field, or words that are already used by
other parties.

Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 952-53.
See supra note 101.
105
https://www.cleveland19.com/2021/07/31/cleveland-guardians-roller-derby-team-files-trademarkapplication/
106 The “others” included Marvel, with which the team reportedly worked something out. Trademark
issues loomed large in consideration of several other names. The team ruled out the Spiders because
it’s the nickname of the University of Richmond. See https://www.cleveland.com/tribe/2021/07/insidestory-of-how-cleveland-indians-became-the-cleveland-guardians-terry-pluto.html (“But a key factor
was the University of Richmond has the Spiders nickname. That created branding issues. It could
be expensive.”). They also ruled out Rockers in part for legal reasons. Id. (“The Guardians, Spiders
and Rockers seem to be the first three names rumored. The Rockers were the name of the former
WNBA franchise in Cleveland. Then there are the Colorado Rockies in the National Leag ue. All
that was a negative.”).
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Our argument to this point might suggest that courts should simply revise the
doctrine to ban suggestive and descriptive marks.107 Perhaps all putative mark
owners should be channeled towards fanciful and arbitrary marks, which do not
create the same types of competition concerns. After all, the supply of those marks is
not infinite, but it is much less limited than the supply of useful descriptive and
suggestive terms. And arbitrary and fanciful marks generally do not convey inherent
competitive advantages in the same manner as descriptive and suggestive marks.
Yet there is a consideration on the other side. Despite the many problems with
descriptive and suggestive marks, those marks can have some value to consumers. It
is easier for consumers to connect suggestive and descriptive marks to particular
products, and this minimizes the cognitive burdens that they face.108 Suggestive and
descriptive marks reduce the amount of work that consumers must do to find a
suitable product or remember what they have purchased in the past. For instance,
consumers might have an easier time remembering that Lyft is a ride-sharing
company because that name is at least suggestive of the services.109 It is useful to
have a company that provides topical pain relief called IcyHot.110 This is, of course,
why firms desire these marks in the first place—and it’s why exclusive control of
those terms provides competitive benefits.
In contrast, the fact that an arbitrary or fanciful mark is not well-connected to
the product means that firms must expend resources on advertising to make that
connection. We will describe these advertising costs in Part III.D below. This
advertising is arguably wasteful. Every time Xfinity runs a commercial to remind
consumers that it is providing wifi, it is expending resources that might be put to
some more socially valuable use. If the firm were instead called “Fast Wifi Company,”
it might not need to spend so much on advertising, or it could devote its advertising

“Ban” here might mean denying trademark status to descriptive and suggestive terms, but allowing
for some more limited unfair competition remedies. That would resemble the system we once had,
which distinguished technical trademarks and other signs. See McKenna, supra note 39, at 326.
108 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trademark Law Pluralism, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1025
(2021).
109 Id.
110 See id. at 1039-46 (describing “distance costs” to consumers and their relation to trademarks).
107
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budget to more socially useful activities, such as informing consumers of the useful
aspects of its products. These advantages of descriptive and suggestive marks, and
those marks’ anticompetitive effects, are two sides of the same coin. It is precisely
because consumers can more easily find a brand, and precisely because establishing
source significance is less expensive, that descriptive and suggestive marks confer
anticompetitive advantages.
Critically, however, the competition costs of suggestive and descriptive marks
are not constant. Each additional mark in a given industry is more harmful to
competition than the last, because each additional mark swallows up more of the
diminishing linguistic space. For instance, it does not necessarily create significant
competitive problems if there is a single cooler company called “Igloo,” or even a
second one called “Yeti.” There are still a wide variety of other terms available to
other producers to describe their coolers: “polar,” “artic,” and so forth. But if fifteen
cooler companies snagged all of the most valuable marks, the sixteenth firm would
find itself facing much tougher sledding.111 This is to say: as the number of descriptive
and suggestive marks in a given market increases, the marginal competitive cost of
each additional mark increases.
At the same time, the value to consumers of descriptive and suggestive marks
decreases as the number of such marks increases. It is useful for there to be one ridesharing service named “Lyft” so consumers can remember it more easily. But once
Lyft exists, it’s less important that there be a second service called “Karpool,” a third
named “Ridez,” and so forth. In other words, as the number of descriptive and
suggestive marks in a given market increases, the marginal benefit of each additional
mark decreases. Figure 1 depicts this relationship graphically:

Thus, we are substantially less concerned about search engine firms claiming descriptive marks
than we are clothing, electronics, or brewing companies.
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Figure 1: Marginal Costs and Benefits of Descriptive and Suggestive Marks

Value

Marginal
cost
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benefit

Number of descriptive and
suggestive marks in the market

Ideally, then, a social planner would set the total number of descriptive and
suggestive marks in any market at the point where the marginal cost and marginal
benefit curves cross. That means that the optimal number of descriptive and
suggestive marks is not zero. Thus, a complete bar on suggestive and descriptive
marks would likely throw out too much baby with the bathwater.112 Instead, a
mechanism that limits the number of descriptive and suggestive marks but does not
completely eliminate them is called for. The next Part describes such a mechanism.

Suggestive and descriptive marks can, as we explain above, produce net social value, so excluding
them entirely and forcing firms to adopt arbitrary or fanciful marks is not warranted.
112
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III.

Doctrinal and Costly Screens
As the preceding sections have made clear, trademark law’s goal should be to

allow pro-competitive trademarks while eliminating (to the greatest extent possible)
anticompetitive ones. That is, the law should engage in screening of trademarks. This
is, of course, one of the primary functions of law, a function that it performs across
many domains. For example, unpatentable inventions are screened out from among
the many patent applications that have been filed.113 Invalid claims to social security
disability benefits are screened from among the many claims asserted.114 Ornamental
designs that do not qualify for design patent protection are screened out from
amongst the many design patent applications filed.115 And so forth.
This screening process represents the normal functioning of law, and so it is
rarely noticed or remarked upon as such. But it is critical to observe that screening
can take place in two different ways. First, law can use substantive doctrinal rules to
screen.116 An invention is patentable only if it is “novel” and “nonobvious.” Title to
land is only valid if it was properly registered at the time of transfer. Etc. The legal
rule sets some condition that must be met before the screen is satisfied. We refer to
these types of barriers as “doctrinal screens,” in that it is legal doctrine and the
decisions of legal actors (i.e., judges, jurors, administrators, or clerks) that are
performing the screening function.117
In the alternative, law can use prices to screen.118 In order to obtain a patent,
it is not enough that the applicant’s invention be novel and nonobvious—the applicant
must also pay a fee.119 For that matter, the process of patent examination itself is
costly: the applicant is typically represented by an attorney or patent agent who

See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010).
See Donald O. Parsons, Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs. 4 J. POLIT. ECON. 859
(1991).
115 Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, Intelligent Design, supra note 8, at 79.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See generally, Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signaling. 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
119 Masur, supra note 113, at 687.
113
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charges thousands of dollars.120 In order to sponsor an employee for an H1-B visa, a
company must pay a substantial fee and must run costly advertisements to determine
if there is an American worker who is willing to take the same job. Obtaining benefits
from the government typically requires filling out substantial amounts of paperwork,
which generates costs for applicants.121 Design patents require application fees as
well, as does registering title to a piece of land.122
At first blush, perhaps these fees and expenses would seem to be merely costs
to the applicant. They might be necessary (someone has to pay the lawyer!) but
otherwise wasteful—to be minimized whenever possible. Yet that is not their only
function. The fees and expenses also operate as screens: they will screen out some
potential rights claimants who are unwilling or unable to pay them. We refer to them
as “costly screens.”123 Although they share a screening function with doctrinal
screens, costly screens shift the locus of decision making from courts and agencies to
individuals. Applicants must choose whether they are willing to pay the necessary
costs.
Doctrinal screens and costly screens are thus two mechanisms by which law
separates and categorizes. Sometimes they function as complements; sometimes as
substitutes; sometimes they work at cross purposes. In the following sections we
describe their operation and explain the principles that should guide policymakers in
the design of systems of screens. We then examine the role that costly screens might
play in the trademark context, as well as the manner in which they actually function.

Id.
Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Torben Transes, Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary
Unemployment. 107 SCAND. J. ECON. 459 (2005).
122 Buccafusco, Masur & Lemley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
123 Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between Screening and Signaling
Models, in PAPERS IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY SEMINAR AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY.
(Michael Dempster ed., 1989).
120
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A.

Categories of Rights and Behavior
Any type of action produces both costs and benefits for the person taking the

action and costs and benefits for society at large.124 The costs and benefits for the
person taking the action are private costs and benefits, because they are realized by
this individual. Some actions have positive private value—they produce net benefits
for the individual. Extracting and selling oil that a person has found on their land
generates positive private value for that individual. Other actions have negative
private value—they produce net costs for the individual. Similarly, some actions have
positive social value and others have negative social value. If the three co-authors of
this paper were to donate all of their life savings to charity, that would generate
positive social value. If the three co-authors of this paper were to form a boy band,
that would generate negative social value.125
These

two

dimensions—private

value

and

social

value—operate

independently.126 Dumping toxic waste into a waterway (and getting away with it)
generates positive private value and negative social value; donating all of one’s money
to charity likely generates net negative private value and positive social value. We
can thus think of all actions as falling somewhere within a two-by-two matrix: they
produce either positive private value and positive social value, negative private value
and positive social value, positive social value and negative private value, or negative
private value and negative social value. Figure 2 displays this graphically.

David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly IP, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677 (2012).
See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Drugs, Patents, and Well-Being, 98 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1403 (2021). One of us (McKenna) disputes this claim, or at least attributes the negative social
value to the other two. Indeed, it is possible that one of us has performed as a member of a boy band,
at least at a law school talent show.
126 Most approaches to considering social value would count the positive private value that an
individual gets from an action even if the net effects of the action are negative. See MATTHEW D ADLER
& ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
124
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Figure 2: Mapping Social and Private Value

One of the primary goals of law—if not the principal goal—is to improve human
welfare.127 Law should encourage behaviors that improve welfare for oneself or others
and discourage behaviors that diminish welfare for oneself or others.128 Accordingly,
social value is what policymakers—courts, legislatures, and others—should care
about.129 The two sections that follow detail the ways in which doctrinal and costly
screens can be used to separate welfare-enhancing activities from welfarediminishing ones, permitting the former while allowing the latter.

Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the Promotion of
Welfare, in ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – VOL. I THEORY, 98 (Ben Depoorter & Peter
Menell, eds., 2019); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
128 These aren’t the only goals that law could or does have. Intellectual property law, including
trademark law, is generally understood to exist to solve particular economic problems that relate to
consumer and producer welfare. See supra Part I. But trademark law might also care about issues of
fairness or distributional concerns beyond welfare maximization. We address some of these issues
below.
129 On the relationship between welfare and social policy generally see Matthew Adler & Marc
Fleurbaey, Introduction, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING & PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Matthew Adler &
Marc Fleurbaey, eds., 2016).
127
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B.

Doctrinal Screens
If a principal goal of law is to increase human welfare, in an idealized world—

one without information costs—law could be written to permit activities that would
enhance welfare and restrict activities that would not. In the context of intellectual
property, this means that law would protect trademarks (or copyrights, or patents)
where doing so will increase welfare and deny protection where it will not. Of course,
legal doctrine is never written to say, “protect a trademark when doing so will
increase welfare.” This would be an impossible standard for any decisionmaker to
adjudicate.130
Rather, substantive legal doctrines—and thus doctrinal screens—can operate
as proxies for the ultimate quantity of interest, namely welfare. Consider patent law
as an example. It is unlikely that granting a patent on an invention that is wellknown or obvious will be welfare-enhancing. The patent didn’t encourage any new
innovation—the invention is well-known—but granting it may create a quasimonopoly and raise prices for consumers.131 The patent requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness thus operate as reasonable doctrinal screens, selecting against
welfare-diminishing inventions.132 Similarly, it is unlikely that giving trademark
rights to a generic term (e.g., “Vacuum”) would enhance welfare. It would have strong
anticompetitive effects on other market participants while doing little to inform
consumers.
Accordingly, a well-calibrated doctrinal screen would draw a line separating
the positive social value behaviors from the negative social value behaviors,
permitting the former and blocking the latter.133 Figure 3 displays this graphically,
where the shading represents activities that are eliminated by the action of the
doctrinal screen.

Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 127, at 104.
W. Nicholson II Price, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 782 (2020).
132 Masur, supra note 113, at 168.
133 Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
130
131
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Figure 3: Idealized Doctrinal Screen

In reality, doctrinal screens are never perfect. Novelty and nonobviousness are
imperfect proxies for identifying inventions for which granting a patent will generate
positive social value;134 the fact that a worker meets the statutory requirements to
qualify for an H-1B visa is an imperfect proxy for whether hiring that worker will
generate positive social value.135 In reality, then, doctrinal screens often exclude some
activities that would generate positive social value and permit some activities that
would generate negative social value. That is, they are both overinclusive and
underinclusive. This might arise because the screens themselves are imperfect
proxies for social value, or because the actors applying the screens do so in imperfect
ways. Figure 4 displays these imperfections graphically. The shading indicates that
some negative social value behaviors will not be screened out, while some positive
social value behaviors will be.

Id.
See H-1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers,
and Fashion Models, https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1bspecialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-and-development-project-workers-and-fashion.
134
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Figure 4: Realistic Doctrinal Screen

Importantly, doctrinal screens necessarily rely on information that is available
to both the private party (in this example, the patent applicant) and the decisionmaker (here, the court or the patent examiner).136 The requirement of novelty would
be unworkable if either the patent applicant or the patent examiner could not
determine whether the invention was novel. The applicant would never know which
patent applications to file or not file; the examiner would never know which
applications to reject or not reject.137

C.

Costly Screens
As we noted above, substantive doctrinal rules are not the only mechanism for

sorting activities or rights. Law sometimes also uses prices: a private party is
required to pay some amount of money before obtaining a legal right or

Stiglitz, supra note 123.
On the quality of granted patents see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67
STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015).
136
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entitlement.138 A costly screen is simply a legal rule that uses price to sort private
parties. Land registration fees, patent application fees (and attorneys’ fees), fees for
H1-B visa applications, the time and effort required to fill out government forms—
these are all costly screens.139 Importantly, a fee or a cost can function as a costly
screen even if it was not intended to do so. Any mechanism that has the effect of using
price to sort between different types of activities or rights functions as a costly screen.
Costly screens can be employed to curb harmful activities of all types. Take,
for instance, the burning of natural gas to produce electricity. Burning natural gas
produces harm through the emission of harmful air pollutants, not least of all carbon
dioxide.140 But burning natural gas also produces benefits by yielding electricity. In
theory, it is preferable if electricity generating plants burn natural gas only when the
value of the electricity outweighs the harm from the emission of air pollution.141 One
way to manage this tradeoff is through traditional regulation: the Environmental
Protection Agency could create a rule that limits the amount of electricity that can be
produced using natural gas, or that allows it in only certain circumstances, and so
forth.142
But an alternative approach would be to simply charge electricity producers a
tax equal to the amount of harm they are producing when they burn natural gas. If a
ton of natural gas produces air pollution that causes $20 in harm, then electricity

Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients.
72 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1982).
139 E.g., Andrew Weiss, Human Capital vs. Signaling Explanations of Wages. 9 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 133, 135
(1995) (“The relationship between wages and education could be the outcome of either students
choosing an education program to signal their ability, or students choosing education levels in response
to the relative wage offers of firms, in which case wages would serve to screen workers.”).
140 Steven Ferrey, Unforced Errors, Legal Fulcrum & International Climate, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
115, 128-29 (2019) (describing the benefits and harms of natural gas as an energy source).
141 See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PENN. L. REV.
93 (2015).
142 For an example of this type of regulation, though not directed in particular at natural gas emissions,
see EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility,
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (2012).
138
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producers could be taxed $20 per ton of natural gas they produce.143 In theory, the
electricity producer would elect to burn natural gas only when the electricity
produced had a value greater than $20. The tax would thus screen out all of the
negative-value uses of natural gas (where the harms outweigh the benefits), leaving
only net positive-value uses (where the benefits outweigh the harms).
Costly screens operate along the dimension of private value. A costly screen
reduces the private value of taking a particular action, because the party that wishes
to take the action must pay for the screen. If the government imposes a fine for
dumping toxic waste, that costly screen alters the private costs and benefits for the
firm that might engage in dumping.144 This is a powerful policy tool because most
private parties will make decisions largely on the basis of private value, not social
value. If a firm thinks that it can get away with dumping toxic waste into a waterway,
it will tend to take this action notwithstanding its social impact.145 But if the firm
will be heavily fined for dumping toxic waste, then the action is more likely to
generate net negative private value and the firm is more likely to refrain from
engaging in it.146
This means that whether a particular action has negative or positive private
value can be endogenous to the existence of a costly screen. Dumping toxic waste has
positive private value for a firm in the absence of a costly screen, but once the
government threatens a heavy fine, it has negative private value. Costly screens can
thus be used to turn some actions that would otherwise generate positive private
value into actions with negative private value. The effect is to deter private parties
from engaging in these actions.147

This is known as a Pigouvian tax: a tax on a harmful activity, set at a level equivalent to the harm
produced by that activity. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U.
PENN. L. REV. 93 (2015).
144 Id.
145 But see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78.
146 Masur & Posner, supra note 141.
147 Vivi Alatas, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken & Julia Tobias, Targeting the Poor:
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. 124 J. POLIT. ECON. 371, 372 (2016).
143
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Instead of simply deterring the firm from engaging in the harmful activity
entirely, the imposition of a costly screen could also encourage the firm to adopt other
options that are less socially costly. In the toxic waste example, a fine for dumping
doesn’t just deter the firm from dumping; it also encourages it to invest in
technologies that might reduce the amount of waste it produces. That is, the costly
screen can help channel actors’ behavior towards less socially costly activities.
Because they operate on private value, costly screens, unlike doctrinal screens,
can rely on information that may only be available to the private party. 148 The
policymaker must be able to determine where to set the costly screen—how much
additional cost should be added to the activity in question. This depends in part upon
the potential harm caused by that activity, as in the natural gas example above. But
the other side of the equation is the value to the private party of taking the action
(dumping waste, etc.). That value may be entirely nontransparent and unknown to
the policymaker. That is not a barrier to using a costly screen. So long as the private
party knows the magnitude of the costly screen and can gauge the value that it places
on the activity in question, it can act accordingly. Costly screens are thus useful in
situations where the regulated party has critical information, such as information
regarding their eligibility for a benefit or entitlement, that the government cannot
access.149
The critical insight from this analysis is that there is no necessary correlation
between social value and private value. Policymakers wish to promote positive social
value activities. But a costly screen will deter relatively low private value activities
by making them net negative. Therefore, the key question is: within a particular legal

Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 287 (“There are some conditions under which even the most able may not
be willing to pay for a ‘general screening”- namely, situations where “individuals are perfectly certain
of their ability, and . . . it is possible for their ability to be costlessly observed ‘on the job[.]’ [T]hen the
individual would offer to absorb all the risk involved in hiring and training cost. There are obviously
instances of this sort, individuals who persuade the employer to hire them at low wages until they can
‘prove themselves’” – i.e., undergo an on-the-job substantive test to objectively and credibly
demonstrate their worth.).
149 See, e.g., Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wojciech Kopczuk, Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up
of Social Benefits. 3 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL. 54 (2011).
148
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context, will the activities deterred by a costly screen—those that are transformed
into negative private value actions—have positive or negative social value? If there
are actions that have low private value but positive social value—such as donating
blood, for instance—imposing a costly screen would be counterproductive.150 The
costly screen will make these into negative private-value activities and potentially
eliminate them.151 But if there are actions that have low private value and negative
social value, a costly screen could have salutary effects by dampening activity.152 The
dashed oval in Figure 5 represents the area of concern.
Figure 5: Assessing Costly Screens

Finally, doctrinal and costly screens can be used in combination.153 The costly
screen will eliminate negative private value activities; the doctrinal screen will
eliminate negative social value activities, with some degree of over- and under-

Cf. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 124.
Sometimes even very low costs, like opting out of a default rule, can meaningfully undermine prosocial behavior. See Eric J Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, SCIENCE 1338 (2003).
152 See Hugo Benítez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky, Hiu Man Chan, Sofia Cheidvasser & John Rust, How Large
Is the Bias in Self-Reported Disability? 19 J. APPL. ECON. 649 (2004) (estimating that in the US Social
Security context, the award error rate is about 20 percent and the rejection error rate about 60 percent);
Jean-Yves Duelos, Modelling the Take-up of State Support. 58 J. PUBLIC ECON. 391(1995) (finding that
in the U.K. Supplementary Benefits scheme, providing means-tested cash benefits to the poor, the
award error rate was 18.8 percent and the rejection error rate was 18.1 percent).
153 See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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inclusion. Again, it is the possibility of this under- and over-inclusion from the
doctrinal screen that makes the costly screen potentially useful. If doctrinal screens
were perfect, there would be no need for costly screens—the doctrinal screens would
do all of the work. But doctrinal screens will inevitably allow some socially harmful
activities to slip through the cracks. Accordingly, costly screens will be a valuable
additional tool in the policymaker’s toolkit if the condition described in the prior
paragraph is met: if the costly screen will eliminate more negative social value
activities than positive social value activities. Figure 6 illustrates the two screens in
combination. The shaded region again represents the doctrinal screen, and the
gingham box represents the costly screen. Some of the activity that would have
provided positive private value to the actor will now produce negative private value.
Figure 6: Doctrinal and Costly Screens in Combination

The application of costly screens thus requires highly context-specific analysis.
Before implementing a costly screen, the policymaker must determine whether the
doctrinal screen is inadequate, and then whether the screen will affect positive or
negative social value activities.154 The answer to this latter question will itself
sometimes depend on the stringency of the screen—that is, how costly it is to
overcome the screen—because the decision to implement a screen is not binary.
154

Masur, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168.
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Policymakers must also consider distributional concerns, to the extent that they are
relevant, when implementing costly screens. By conditioning rights or resources on
parties’ willingness to pay for them, costly screens can also interact with those
parties’ ability to pay. Thus, in certain situations, parties might not obtain rights or
resources that they would have been willing to pay for if only they had enough money
to pay for them. Charging people to vote, for example, might screen out people with
weak preferences between candidates, but it would also screen out people with strong
preferences but not enough money.155 Accordingly, policymakers must be sensitive to
a costly screen’s wealth effects. The next section undertakes this type of contextspecific analysis with respect to trademark law.

D.

Trademark Law’s Costly Screens
In Part II, we analyzed a number of trademark law’s doctrinal screens that are

meant to exclude negative social value rights from accruing, and we found them
wanting. But doctrinal screens aren’t the whole story. Trademark law imposes two
expenses on claimants that, at first glance, might appear to be costly screens.
First, trademark law imposes a costly screen for applicants who wish to
register their trademarks. Registration costs money, both in the form of fees and
(usually) attorneys’ fees. But registration isn’t mandatory, and indeed under modern
law, unregistered marks can be protected under federal law on largely the same terms
as registered marks. There are benefits to registration, to be sure, but registration
remains distinctly less important than in patent and even than copyright, where
registration isn’t mandatory but one can’t file a lawsuit unless and until the copyright
is registered.156 Thus, trademark registration doesn’t create much of a costly screen.
In addition, trademark law occasionally imposes a separate costly screen that
can be both mandatory and expensive: the secondary meaning requirement for marks
that aren’t inherently distinctive. Establishing and proving secondary meaning can

RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 13-36 (1980).
According to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 411, a copyright lawsuit cannot be brought until
“registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”
155
156
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be very costly for claimants, and, depending on how high those costs are, the
secondary meaning requirement could serve to exclude low-private-value descriptive
marks. In this section, we first explain the costs and benefits of trademark
registration before turning to our larger contribution: analyzing secondary meaning
as a costly screen. We conclude that the requirement of secondary meaning is
similarly imperfect as a costly screen because it imposes only small marginal costs on
putative mark holders.

1. Registration
Parties that have made use of a mark may register that mark with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.157 To be registrable, the claimed mark must be
capable of identifying the source of the applicant’s goods and services and must not
run afoul of any of the substantive grounds for refusal articulated in section 2 of the
statute.158 Among other things, the claimed mark must not be likely to cause
confusion with a mark previously registered or in use, and it must not be descriptive
of the applicant’s goods or services, unless the applicant can also prove secondary
meaning.159 The applicant must also pay registration fees, and in most cases, the fees
of the attorneys who prosecute their applications. Registration fees range from $250
to $350, and attorneys’ fee can add an additional thousand dollars or more.160 Because
the statute provides the opportunity for third parties to oppose registration,
applicants also sometimes have to pay the costs of opposition proceedings (which
operate like federal civil litigation in most respects) to see their application through
to registration.161
Parties can also apply to register on the basis of a bona fide intent to use the mark, but those marks
will not be registered unless and until the applicant can demonstrate that it has actually made use of
the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d).
158 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
159 Id. at § 1052(c), (d).
160 https://www.richardspatentlaw.com/faq/how-much-does-a-trademark-cost/ (mentioning $1000$2000 in fees for relatively complex registration issues).
161 Registrations can also be cancelled on petition of third parties. The grounds for cancellation become
more limited after 5 years, but some grounds (including genericness and functionality but not
including descriptiveness) remain forever. 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
157
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Yet federal registration has never been mandatory in the United States, and
that remains true today. Indeed, under current law, unregistered marks are
enforceable under federal law on largely the same terms as registered marks.162
That’s not to say that registration doesn’t have significant benefits.163 Most
importantly, federal registration confers nationwide priority,164 and registrations can
become incontestable, a benefit that is particularly valuable for descriptive marks.165
Those benefits are good incentive for parties to seek registration, at least of marks
they know they will be using for longer periods of time. But because unregistered
marks are enforceable under federal law, the costs of registration aren’t mandatory,
and in many cases parties do not pay them. Most trade dress, for example, is never
registered.166 The costs of registration thus function only very weakly as a costly
screen, at least as currently constituted.

2. Secondary Meaning as Costly Screen
As we explained above, for all trademarks that are not inherently distinctive,
claimants must show that they have developed secondary meaning.167 Unlike
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). That has not always been true. Every federal trademark statute prior to the
Lanham Act made enforcement in federal court contingent on federal registration. Act of March 19,
1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533, repealed by Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946); TradeMark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (creating a cause of action for infringement of
registered marks), repealed by Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946); see also id. § 17
(granting federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving use of a registered mark in interstate
commerce).
163 See, e.g., B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015) (“Registration is
significant.”).
164 Under the Lanham Act as originally passed, registration served as constructive notice and
constructive nationwide use. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 489, § 22, 60 Stat. 427, 435 (1946) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2018)) (“Registration of a mark on the principal register provided
by this Act . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”). As of
November 16, 1989, the effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act, contingent on registration,
the application date serves as the constructive notice and constructive use date. Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 109, § 7, 102 Stat. 3935, 3938–39 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2018)).
165 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2018). Incontestable marks can no longer be challenged on certain grounds,
including descriptiveness.
166 Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law,
130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017).
167 See supra Part II.A.
162
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inherently distinctive signs, which the law treats as trademarks immediately upon
use, non-inherently distinctive marks are subject to a separate criterion of validity.
But unlike the functionality rules, for example, the secondary meaning requirement
isn’t only, and maybe isn’t even really, a doctrinal screen. Instead, making claimants
of non-inherently distinctive marks establish and prove secondary meaning is best
understood as a costly screen. Here we consider the extent of the rule’s costs and its
effectiveness as screening tool.
If we are to believe the standard trademark story, the first cost associated with
the secondary meaning requirement involves developing secondary meaning in the
first place. This is because, as we are repeatedly told, consumers are not predisposed
to treat descriptive words, single colors, or product designs as source indicators. 168
When consumers see a geographic term on a product, such as Nantucket Reds
trousers, or when they perceive the design of a product, like a penguin shaped cocktail
shaker, the law assumes that consumers interpret the word or shape in a nontrademark way.169 To the extent that this is true, a firm that wants to use a noninherently distinctive sign must first teach consumers to treat that sign as a mark.170
Enough consumers must learn to make the semantic switch from the mark’s primary
meaning—these are red trousers made in Nantucket—to the mark’s secondary
meaning—these trousers made by a particular company that is using Nantucket Reds
as a trademark.171 In most cases, this will require substantial expenditures on
advertising.172 The first time that consumers interact with the jeweler Tiffany & Co.,
they presumably won’t think that the robin’s egg blue color of its packages is anything

See cases cited supra notes 33-37.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 209.
170 Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1110
(2003).
171 See Murray’s Toggery Shop, The Nantucket Reds Collection, www.nantucketreds.com.
172 Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1927) (“The spread of an
advertisement among people is like everspreading ripples from a pebble thrown into still water. The
ripples go out and out in an ever-increasing circle from a common center, long after the pebble is lost
to sight. … Throwing pebbles into water is child's play, but knowledge of a trademark, through
advertising and as carried by the people, is an important, valuable business asset, gained at much
expense.”).
168
169
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more than an elegant color for boxes. But through repeated exposure to Tiffany’s
advertisements, consumers have learned to connect the color with the Tiffany brand.
Once a firm believes it has developed secondary meaning for its non-inherently
distinctive trademark, it must next prove that it has done so, either to the PTO or to
the courts, if it wants to enforce its exclusivity. Legally proving secondary meaning
could make the screen costlier. The best evidence of secondary meaning is direct
evidence that a sufficient percentage of relevant consumers treat the mark as having
acquired distinctiveness.173 While direct evidence can come from the testimony of
random buyers,174 many courts say that the most persuasive evidence of secondary
meaning comes from consumer surveys conducted by experts.175 Courts admit various
types of surveys aimed at showing that consumers treat a term as a trademark,176
but all of those surveys are expensive. Estimates of the cost of a professional
trademark survey range from the high five figures well into six figures. 177
Accordingly, the best proof of secondary meaning is also very expensive proof.
Given this expense, most claimants attempt to prove secondary meaning via
circumstantial evidence.178 In such cases, claimants must raise an inference that a
non-inherently distinctive sign has acquired distinctiveness by way of proxy. 179
Courts and the PTO consider many kinds of evidence in evaluating circumstantial
proof of secondary meaning including:
1. Length and manner of use;
2. Amount and manner of advertising;
3. Amount of sales and number of customers; and

MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 15.30.
Id.
175 Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989)
176 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 32.191; Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the
Content and Procedural Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1027, 1036 (2007).
177 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CAL. L. REV. 351, 361 (2014)
and sources cited.
178 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of The Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1581, 1641 (2006) (finding that only 20% of litigated cases addressed survey evidence).
179 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 15.51.
173
174

47
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4030291

4. Recognition by the trade, media, or potential customers.180
Of course, obtaining credible information of these types will be at least somewhat
expensive for firms trying to prove secondary meaning. But it is worth noting that
many of the most relevant factors require proving that the claimant spent money on
its trademark or trade dress. McCarthy explains courts’ inferences about advertising
expenses and secondary meaning: “The seller spent a large amount of money on
advertising. The larger the amount spent, the greater the exposure of buyers to this
symbol as a trademark: The greater the exposure, the greater the likelihood that
buyers will associate this symbol with one seller in a trademark sense.”181
It is difficult to specify the amount of advertising expenditures that courts or
the PTO will treat as persuasive of secondary meaning, because it is “the likely effect
rather than the effort invested in such activities that is determinative.”182 That is to
say, courts claim to care about more than the sum of advertising expenditures but
rather whether those expenditures raise an inference that the way in which the mark
or dress was used will cause it to be treated as source-identifying.183 Nonetheless, all
else being equal, a claimant is more likely to succeed if it spends millions of dollars
on advertising than if it spends tens of thousands of dollars.
Relative to other costly screens in IP law, the secondary meaning requirement
appears, at first glance, to create an extremely expensive hurdle to the acquisition of
exclusive rights in non-inherently distinctive trademarks and trade dress. Obtaining
a utility patent, for example, typically costs about $35,000, including filing fees and
attorneys’ fees.184 Compare that to the hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars that firms must spend on advertising to establish and prove secondary
meaning.

Id. at § 15.30.
Id. at § 15.51.
182 RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 13, cmt. 3. See also Alyssa Morrison, The Advertising Factor
in the Secondary Meaning Instruction, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 296, 300 (2010).
183 MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 15.52.
184 Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 113, at 527.
180
181
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But when it comes to understanding the magnitude of a costly screen, the issue
is not merely the gross sum of money expended. Rather, what matters is the marginal
cost added by the costly screen, above and beyond what the right-seeker would
otherwise have spent. In other words: how much must a firm pay to obtain trademark
rights in a descriptive term, compared with what it would otherwise have spent? This
raises two problems. First, as should be obvious, firms aren’t spending large sums on
advertising only in order to establish valid trademarks. They’re spending the money
because they believe it will generate private value for the firm by encouraging people
to purchase the firm’s products. Firms invest money in advertising because doing so
can be profitable. Tiffany & Co. doesn’t spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually
advertising with its blue color185 solely to obtain valid trade dress rights in it; it does
so because it hopes that positive associations between the blue color and the brand
will give it a competitive advantage in the market.186 More importantly, even if there
were no prospect of acquiring trademark rights in the color blue, and even if that
meant Tiffany wouldn’t spend any money trying to build the positive associations
with that color, that wouldn’t mean Tiffany would spend less on advertising. It would
just advertise differently and focus on different things.
Because firms don’t treat advertising expenses as pure costs, the magnitude of
the secondary meaning requirement’s costly screen is substantially lower than it
seems. Unlike the filing and attorneys’ fees that a firm must pay to obtain a patent,
the costs associated with advertising usually are willfully undertaken irrespective of
trademark validity. Of the total that a firm spends on advertising its products, it
seems likely that very little money is spent solely for purposes of establishing proof
of secondary meaning. Put another way, if trademark law allowed Tiffany & Co. to
establish exclusive rights in its blue color automatically with use, we do not think
that Tiffany would reduce its advertising expenditures to any meaningful degree.

Tiffany & Co.'s advertising spend worldwide from 2015 to 2019 (in million U.S. dollars),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/857617/global-advertising-spend-of-tiffany-and-co/
186 Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti Competition
Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263 (2008).
185
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Second, the costs of establishing an arbitrary or fanciful mark are high as well.
This matters for how well the costly screen channels parties towards less socially
costly behavior. There is of course no statutory requirement that an arbitrary or
fanciful mark have secondary meaning, so the issue is not so much connecting the
mark to the firm. Rather, the point is that the owner of an arbitrary or fanciful mark
will have to spend more than the proponent of a descriptive or suggestive mark to
connect its mark to the product being sold.187 That is, it will likely cost ADT more in
advertising to cause consumers to identify its company with home security than it
would cost SimpliSafe to achieve the same identification. This is, of course, one of the
main reasons why firms often opt for descriptive and suggestive marks in the first
place.
Accordingly, the true measure of the secondary meaning screen is reflected in
the relationship between two costs: (1) the cost of getting consumers to treat a term
as a trademark (source significance), and (2) the cost of getting consumers to associate
the term with the product (product significance). The magnitude of the costly screen,
then, is the difference between how much the owner of a non-inherently distinctive
mark will have to pay to establish both (1) source significance and (2) product
significance, and how much the owner of an inherently distinctive mark will have to
pay to establish the same. Quantity (1) is likely somewhat larger for descriptive and
suggestive marks because of the doctrinal screen embedded in trademark law.
Claiming a non-inherently distinctive mark requires expending money creating and
proving secondary meaning. But quantity (2) is likely larger for arbitrary and fanciful
marks, because firms need to spend money getting consumers to connect the mark to
the product.
It is difficult to know for which type of mark the sum of the costs (1) + (2) will
be larger. But our point is not necessarily that descriptive and suggestive marks will
be cheaper to obtain than arbitrary and fanciful ones. Rather, the point is that the

187

Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 108, at 1039.

50
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4030291

gap in cost will be relatively small, not large enough to establish a costly screen that
will effectively eliminate negative social value/low private value marks.

IV.

Aligning Trademark Validity and Competition

As currently constituted, trademark law’s combination of doctrinal and costly
screens is insufficiently sensitive to competition concerns. The law’s doctrinal screen
between inherently distinctive and non-inherently distinctive marks is ill-drawn and
difficult to apply. Too often, firms can easily obtain trademark rights that produce
anticompetitive effects. This wouldn’t be as much of a problem if the law’s costly
screens—registration and secondary meaning—were better at excluding negative
social value marks. But those screens are simply too inexpensive. In this Part, we
offer a series of proposals for each trademark domain that would more clearly align
doctrinal and costly screens with trademark law’s competition goals.

A.

Screening Trademarks
The problems we have noted with word marks apply particularly to descriptive

and suggestive marks. The supply of fanciful and arbitrary marks is much greater
than the supply of suggestive and descriptive marks; for any given product, there will
always be more invented words or words that have nothing to do with the product
than there will be unused words that are associated with the product. We are also
less concerned about owners of arbitrary marks gaining anticompetitive advantages
by preventing others from referencing the type of product at issue using the arbitrary
mark, precisely because arbitrary and fanciful marks often have no connection with
the product other than source significance.188 And so long as arbitrary marks do not
resemble one another too closely—which should be avoidable, given the array of
options available—they are unlikely to create too much clutter or consumer

As we discussed in Part II, there are marks that the law treats as arbitrary but, because of sound
significance, operate as suggestive marks (e.g. Swiffer and Viagra). Supra note 71. We would treat
those as suggestive marks.
188
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confusion. But descriptive and suggestive marks, by contrast, raise all of these
concerns in spades. When marks group around the thing they are meant to describe,
concerns of clutter, anticompetitive behavior, and consumer confusion are at their
apex.
As we have suggested, one solution is to impose a costly screen. This costly
screen, if appropriately applied, would serve two purposes. First, it would make it
costlier for firms to acquire potentially anticompetitive marks. Again, a firm always
has the option of electing an arbitrary or fanciful mark, which are less likely to be
anticompetitive.189 If a descriptive or suggestive mark becomes more costly to acquire,
a firm seeking a competitive advantage will face a higher bar to acquire that
advantage. This will channel more firms toward acquiring arbitrary and fanciful
marks, while forcing firms that elect marks that provide competitive advantages to
pay for those advantages.190 Second, and relatedly, imposing a substantial costly
screen will act as a type of congestion pricing. The number of potential mark holders
who will be willing to pay the steep fees to obtain the relevant marks will be lower
than the number of people who might otherwise try to claim those marks.191 This will
help address the twin concerns of congestion and depletion of word marks.192
As we explained above, the usefulness of a costly screen is determined by the
proportion of negative social value/low private value activities to positive social
value/low private value activities it will screen out. If a costly screen will screen out
significant numbers of positive social value activities, compared with the number of
negative social value activities it will eliminate, then it is counter-productive and will
likely be welfare diminishing. If, on the other hand, the screen will largely eliminate
negative social value activities, and the number of positive social value activities that
will be affected is low, then the screen should be welfare-enhancing. It will curb

Though, as we noted earlier, those marks can have clear advantages when taking into account
sound symbolism and non-semantic meaning. See supra notes 67-73.
190 In particular, the costly screen will use firms’ private information about the tradeoff between
competitively harmful suggestive and descriptive marks and competitively benign arbitrary and
fanciful marks.
191 Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 953
192 Id.
189
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harmful actions without meaningfully reducing the number of socially beneficial
ones.
There is little question that large numbers of negative social value/low private
value descriptive and suggestive trademarks could proliferate, absent any sort of
screen. That is, the lower-right-hand box (box 4) of Table 1 could be heavily populated.
It would include marks that firms had no intention of using or that weren’t being
used as trademarks but rather for their informational value,193 as well as descriptive
terms that are important for competitors to use. If firms were able to protect those
terms as trademarks, they could deprive competitors of the ability to adequately
describe their products to consumers, lead to competitive advantages that distort
competition, and redound to the detriment of consumers.194 The existence of these
potential harms, and the inability of doctrinal screens to adequately police this
boundary, is the prima facie case for a costly screen.
What about positive social value/low private value trademarks? Would a costly
screen bar many of these types of marks? The answer is that marks in this category
are unlikely to exist, or at least to exist in meaningful numbers. To understand why,
first consider the potential social value of such marks. As we have explained, the
social value of a trademark lies in the fact that it signals source to consumers.195 It is
socially valuable for consumers to understand that a particular pair of shoes comes
from Nike, or a particular refrigerator from Whirlpool, because it allows them to
assess the quality of these goods based on past experiences or existing reviews before
purchasing them. That is to say, the value to the consumer of identifying marks is
the additional consumer surplus they will obtain from being able to confidently
purchase the refrigerator they want, rather than getting some other refrigerator or
having to use other information to figure out which refrigerator is which.
The key point is that much of this value is likely to be captured by the firm
producing the product. If there are customers who prefer Whirlpool refrigerators and

Roberts, supra note 28, at 313.
See supra notes 66-69.
195 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined..
193
194
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are willing to pay extra to obtain Whirlpool refrigerators, Whirlpool will understand
this fact and be able to charge them accordingly. That is, some of the surplus created
when a consumer who wants a Whirlpool refrigerator is able to purchase a Whirlpool
refrigerator will be shared with the producer. This means that any positive social
value mark should have positive private value as well—both the consumer (the
“social” component of this analysis) and the firm (the “private” component) will
benefit. In turn, that means that there should be vanishingly few positive social
value/low private value marks. This is in contrast to many other areas of law,
including copyright law, where high social value/low private value works abound.196
And that, in turn, means that this is an area of law ripe for the imposition of a costly
screen.

B.

The Mechanics of a Costly Screen
As we explained in Part III, trademark law already employs two price screens

that could, in theory, serve to weed out negative social value marks—
registration/maintenance fees and the secondary meaning requirement. Registration
and maintenance fees are voluntary and very low when they are paid, and they apply
irrespective of the anticompetitive risk associated with a particular mark. Secondary
meaning, while it appears to set a large costly screen, in fact, imposes little marginal
cost on claimants of descriptive terms. The solution is to raise the costly screens
against descriptive and suggestive marks. This would have the effect of creating some
distance between the costs of acquiring those marks and the cost of acquiring
arbitrary and fanciful marks. To create this necessary distance, the additional cost
would need to be some multiple of the existing costs of registration and creating and
proving secondary meaning. Here we propose alternatives to both screens that will
align them more closely with competitive concerns. Our goal is to use costly screens
to encourage firms to adopt arbitrary or fanciful marks when doing so will produce

See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 124, at 254. Authors produce numerous works that may
generate significant but diffuse social value that they cannot fully and easily capture.
196
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less social cost.197 In addition, boosting the costly screens may help cut down on the
number of marks that firms are willing to claim.198
As a general matter, it is preferable that costly screens are imposed in the form
of fees or fines, rather than expenditures made for other purposes. The expense
associated with creating secondary meaning is a social cost—once spent on
advertising, the dollars cannot be recovered. That is necessary in the context of
secondary meaning, because without source significance there is little social value to
trademarks. But here the goal is simply to raise costs on owners of descriptive and
suggestive marks in order to deter anticompetitive behavior. Accordingly, it would be
preferable if the costly screen were simply paid to the federal government to be used
for other purposes, such as improved registration processes.199 In light of this, we
focus first on creating a costly screen with registration fees.

1. Registration
For registration fees to serve as a costly screen they must be far higher than
current rates, which allow claimants to register a mark for a few thousand dollars.
Further, in order to appropriately incentivize behavior, registration fees should be
calibrated by competitive harm. It should cost far more to register a suggestive mark
than an arbitrary or fanciful mark and even more to register a descriptive mark. The
significantly higher fees wouldn’t simply screen out firms with low willingness (or

As Hemel and Ouellette note, forcing firms to choose marks far from what they call the “semantic
core” can also impose costs on society, as firms must spend more money to create associations and
because consumers may struggle to recognize unusual marks. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 108, at
35. One major benefit of a costly screen is that it relies on firms’ private knowledge about the costs
and benefits of choosing marks that are further from the semantic core.
198 Sometimes firms may desire the opportunity to claim exclusive rights in additional marks, but those
additional marks may create little consumer value. Consider the situation with craft beer names.
Yuengling Brewing may want to claim the term “golden” as a brand name for its pilsner style beer.
But if Yuengling only makes one pilsner style beer, the additional name isn’t giving consumers any
additional information, but it is affecting the ability of other breweries to describe their beers. See
Said, supra note 102.
199 On the role of user fees at the PTO see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed
Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEG. STUD. 602 (2014).
197
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ability) to pay these costs; they would also serve as an explicit signal that other, less
socially costly marks can be had for much cheaper.200 Further study is warranted to
determine the level of registration fees that would generate optimal channeling and
deterrence, especially in light of potential distributive concerns discussed below.201
Registration is, of course, voluntary in the U.S., so firms might simply try to
avoid these screens if the prices get too high.202 There are several solutions available
to this concern. First, trademark law might try to further increase the benefits of
associated with registration. In particular, the law might treat arbitrary and fanciful
marks as incontestable at the time of registration, rather than requiring the mark
owner to wait five years before applying for incontestable status.203 While registration
gives the mark owner prima facie evidence of exclusive rights to the mark,
incontestability gives the owner conclusive evidence thereof, subject to some limited
defenses.204 In addition, trademark law could condition the availability of certain
remedies, including injunctive relief205 or attorneys’ fees,206 on registration of the
mark.
The U.S. is allowed to substantially raise its registration fees and remain in compliance with its
international obligations. Article 6 of the Paris Convention gives each country the right to determine
the conditions for riling and registering trademarks in its domestic legislation. According to the World
Trade Organization, “an applicant who chooses to seek registration of a trademark in a particular
foreign country under Article 6 must comply with the conditions for filing and registration specified in
that country’s legislation.” Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (Apr. 15,
1994).
201 See infra Part IV.A.3
202 In some respects, of course, that is our goal. We want firms to instead choose arbitrary and fanciful
marks rather than suggestive or descriptive ones.
203 Under current law, a registrant can seek incontestability by filing an affidavit “within one year
after the expiration of any such five-year period setting forth those goods or services stated in the
registration on or in connection with which such mark has been in continuous use for such five
consecutive years and is still in use in commerce,” and meeting the other requirements of 15 U.S.C. §
1065.
204 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115. For example, a defendant can still challenge an incontestable mark as functional
and thus invalid.
205 Injunctive relief is standard in trademark infringement cases irrespective of registration. Mark A.
Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795 (2017).
206 Attorneys’ fees are currently available in “exceptional” cases under the Lanham Act. Christopher
P. Bussert, Interpreting the "Exceptional Cases" Provision of Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act: When
an Award of Attorney's Fees is Appropriate, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1119 (2002). Typically, this
means willful or intentionally deceptive infringement. We could relax that requirement to treat all
infringements as exceptional if we wanted to further incentivize registration.
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Another possibility is to make registration a condition of federal enforcement
of trademarks.207 That requirement could be tailored to the specific costs of
descriptive terms by making federal jurisdiction unavailable to unregistered
descriptive terms.208 There would be costs to that approach, since it would make
categorization of the claimed mark a jurisdictional question even though it would
require factual development. But that cost might be a virtue from the perspective of
costly screens—claimants of potentially descriptive unregistered terms would run the
risk of having their cases dismissed after having had to litigate the classification
issue, which should do more to encourage registration.209 The goal is to make it
almost essential that firms register marks in order to force those firms that wish to
use descriptive or suggestive marks to pay the required costly screen. 210 If
enforcement were conditioned on expensive registration, claimants would be
discouraged from asserting rights in marks in anticompetitive strike suits if the fees
are set high enough to make such actions net negative value.

2. Tying Secondary Meaning to Registration
Making registration more valuable or a precondition to filing suit could also be
used to boost the costly screen associated with proving secondary meaning for
descriptive marks. As we argued in Part III, in most cases, the secondary meaning
requirement for descriptive marks adds little to firms’ marginal costs. Because they
can rely on circumstantial evidence of advertising expenditures, and because they
would tend to spend that money anyway, the secondary meaning requirement isn’t

That was the way things worked before courts reinterpreted the Lanham Act to find unregistered
marks enforceable under § 43(a). See Mark P. McKenna, Registration and Federalization, CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. (forthcoming 2021). Claimants still might bring lawsuits alleging violations of state
unfair competition laws, but those are will be much less valuable than federal litigation.
208 This approach is not dissimilar to copyright law’s treatment of registration, where registration is
necessary to file a federal lawsuit even though a copyright is valid from the moment of fixation.
209 And registration has substantial social benefits generally, because it improves competitors’ notice
of claimed marks.
210 A different approach would require firms to pay a huge fee before filing a federal lawsuit on
descriptive or suggestive terms. There might still be an adjudication challenge, however, and we would
lose the notice benefits that registration provides.
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generating any news costs.211 If anything, it may be increasing costs for competitors
whose litigation expenses include contesting secondary meaning. If more descriptive
marks were required to be registered, however, the PTO could condition validity on
better quality and more expensive proof of secondary meaning as a condition of
registration.
For example, the PTO could require claimants of descriptive marks to establish
secondary meaning with direct survey evidence rather than with circumstantial
evidence. Although survey methods are far from perfect, 212 mandating them for
registration would have numerous benefits. First, requiring this evidence for
registration might push the Trademark Office to help develop better methodologies
with the help of non-partisan experts. If such surveys could be developed, they would
almost certainly provide better evidence than the circumstantial evidence that is
currently offered for secondary meaning. In addition, from the perspective of costly
screening, quality doesn’t matter as much because surveys, unlike circumstantial
evidence, impose meaningful marginal costs on claimants. As we mentioned, expert
surveys can cost $100,000 or more.213 The advantage of imposing these additional
costs at the time of registration—rather than litigation—is that trademark
defendants would not be forced to conduct their own competing surveys and expend
their own resources providing evidence of the lack of secondary meaning. The costs
would fall entirely on trademark owners. As defendants’ litigation costs go down, so
should their willingness to settle anticompetitive lawsuits. At the same time, the
downside to this approach is that the PTO would be adjudicating secondary meaning
ex parte, without the benefit of the adversarial process. Poorly executed surveys and
marks that only debatably have secondary meaning might be more likely to slip
through.
Nonetheless, increasing the magnitude of the costly screen for descriptive
marks would generate benefits across the spectrum of marks. Obviously, by making
See supra Part III.C.
Barton Beebe, Roy Germano, Christopher Jon Sprigman, & Joel H. Steckel, Testing for Trademark
Dilution in Court and the Lab, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (2019).
213 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-51.
211
212
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descriptive marks much more expensive, firms will be encouraged to choose marks
that won’t face these costs. But, because of the uncertainty and inconsistency of the
suggestive/descriptive line, risk averse firms would move even further out the
distinctiveness spectrum. Thus, a firm considering using the term BUTTER on its
Chardonnay would now have to worry that the PTO would determine that its mark
is descriptive rather the suggestive, requiring it to pay a higher registration fee and
expend substantial sums proving secondary meaning. Instead, it might simply choose
an arbitrary or fanciful term, avoiding the higher costs and, importantly for society,
imposing less competitive harm on consumers and other firms.

C.

The Distributive Consequences of Costlier Screens
Substantially raising registration fees or increasing the expenses associated

with proving secondary meaning will, of course, produce a disproportionate impact
on poorer firms than on rich ones. As we mentioned in Part III, wealth effects are
unavoidable consequences of using prices as a sorting mechanism. This is one of the
reasons why costly screens are an imperfect solution to the limitations of doctrinal
screens. Ultimately, though, we believe that our proposal will tend to help small
businesses and new entrants.
Our animating concern is that current trademark law makes anticompetitive
behavior far too easy, limiting the ability of smaller and newer firms from entering
markets. By raising the costs of anticompetitive behavior, we hope to even the playing
field for new entrants. Relative to the status quo, our proposal should reduce the
number of descriptive and suggestive marks in a given field, making it easier for new
entrants to reach consumers and sell their goods. Currently, initial market entrants
combine first-mover advantages with cheap and easy access to anticompetitve
trademarks. Costly screens are an option for addressing the latter concern.
Importantly, the costly screens that we propose for certain trademarks are
unlike other costly screens that condition rights on payments. If a person can’t afford
a poll tax, she doesn’t get to vote. If a firm can’t pay to obtain a patent, it simply does
not get one. By contrast, if a relatively poor firm determines that it cannot afford to
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pay for a suggestive or descriptive trademark, it can instead choose an arbitrary or
fanciful one and avoid the costly screen. As we explain in Part III.C, those marks
aren’t costless, because they require advertising to establish product significance. But
the firm is not categorically excluded from claiming and asserting trademark rights.
Although some firms may get priced out of using marks that they would prefer, we
believe that new entrants should prefer costlier screens for terms that will be
anticompetitive.

Conclusion
At its core, trademark law is about competition. Trademarks exist to promote
fair and effective competition by allowing firms to identify the source of their products
to consumers. This enables consumers to purchase the goods they want from the firms
they trust, and it creates incentives for firms to build and maintain reputations for
quality, which similarly redounds to the benefit of consumers. But the law as it stands
has lost track of this goal. The law makes it too easy—and too cheap—for firms to
acquire trademarks that afford significant competitive advantages by their very
nature. The problem is that the law focuses only on whether a trademark signifies
source while ignoring whether the trademark simultaneously affords competitive
advantages.
Yet when a firm acquires and asserts a descriptive or suggestive trademark, it
gains an edge over competitors who can no longer use those terms to describe their
own products. This advantage has nothing to do with the underlying merits of the
products in question. Rather, it is driven by the fact that the government has
awarded a monopoly over certain words to one firm and not another. The situation is
even worse in crowded areas of commerce where trademarks proliferate and limit the
options available to everyone, including new entrants. This type of monopoly-driven
power will lead to less robust competition, higher prices, and losses for consumers.
It does not have to be this way. Trademark law’s doctrinal screens are not
effective at weeding out anticompetitive marks and preventing the linguistic space
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from being overrun by too many marks. What is needed is a more robust costly screen,
one that imposes substantial costs on putative owners of suggestive and descriptive
marks. Such a costly screen would operate as a form of congestion pricing, reducing
trademark overcrowding and freeing up linguistic space for competition. It would also
help channel firms away from anticompetitive marks and toward marks that do not
offer competitive advantages. This more robust costly screen could be coupled with
doctrinal changes that further limit firms’ ability to strategically leverage
trademarks as state-sponsored monopolistic tools. Some of these changes would
require legislative action; others could be implemented by the PTO. But all of them
would help reorient trademark law back toward the pro-competitive role it was
always meant to occupy.
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